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Abstract
User authentication and intrusion detection differ from standard clas-
sification problems in that while we have data generated from legitimate
users, impostor or intrusion data is scarce or non-existent. We review
existing techniques for dealing with this problem and propose a novel
alternative based on a principled statistical decision-making view point.
We examine the technique on a toy problem and validate it on complex
real-world data from an RFID based access control system. The results
indicate that it can significantly outperform the classical world model
approach. The method could be more generally useful in other decision-
making scenarios where there is a lack of adversary data.
1 Introduction
Classification is the problem of categorising data in one of two or more possible
classes. In the classical supervised learning framework, examples of each class
have already been obtained and the task of the decision maker is to accurately
categorise new observations, whose class is unknown. The accuracy is either
measured in terms of the rate of misclassification, or in terms of the average
cost, for problems where different types of errors carry different costs. In that
setting, the problem has three phases: (a) the collection of training data, (b) the
estimation of a decision rule based on the training data and (c) the application
1
of the decision rule to new data. Typically, the decision rule remains fixed after
the second step. Thus, the problem becomes that of finding the decision rule
with minimum risk from the training data.
Unfortunately, some problems are structured in such a way that it is not
possible to obtain data from all categories to form the decision rule. Novelty
detection, user authentication, network intrusion detection and spam filtering
all belong to this type of decision problems: while the data of the “normal”
class is relatively easily characterised, the data of the other class which we wish
to detect is not. This is partially due to the potentially adversarial nature of
the process that generates the data of the alternative class. As an example,
consider being asked to decide whether a particular voice sample belongs to a
specific person, given a set of examples of his voice and your overall experience
concerning the voices of other persons.
In this paper, we shall employ two conceptual classes: the “user” and the
“adversary”. The main distinction is that while we shall always have examples
of instances of the user class, we may not have any data from the adversary
class.
This problem is alleviated in authentication settings, where we must separate
accesses by a specific user from accesses by an adversary. Such problems contain
additional information: data which we have obtained from other people. This
can be used to create a world model, which can then act as an adversary model,
and has been used with state-of-the-art results in authentication [5, 12, 20].
Since there is no explicit adversary model, the probability of an attack can-
not be estimated. Our main contribution is a decision making principle which
employs a pessimistic estimate on the probability of an attack. Intuitively, this
is done by conditioning the adversary model on the current observations, whose
class is unknown. This enables us to place an upper bound on the probability of
the adversary class, in a Bayesian framework. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first time that such a Bayesian worst-case approach has been described in
the literature. The proposed method is compared with both an oracle and the
world model approach on a test-bench. This shows that our approach can out-
perform the world model under a variety of conditions. This result is validated
on the real-world problem of detecting unauthorised accesses in a building.
The remainder of this section discusses related work. The model frame-
work is introduced in Sec. 2, with the proposed Bayesian estimates discussed
in Sec. 2.2 and methods for estimating the prior in Sec. 2.3. The conclusion is
preceded by Sec. 3, which presents experiments and results.
1.1 Related work
Classification algorithms have been extensively used for the detection of intru-
sions in wired [4, 17] and wireless [8, 14] networks. Their main disadvantage is
that labelled normal and attack data must be available for training. After the
training phase, the classifier’s learnt model will be used to predict the labels of
new unknown data. However, such data is very hard to obtain and often unre-
liable. Finally, there will always exist new unknown attacks for which training
data are not available at all.
Outlier detection [3, 19] and clustering [18] use unlabelled data and are in
principle able to detect unknown types of attacks. The main disadvantage is
that no explicit adversarial model is employed.
An alternative framework is the world model approach [5, 12, 20]. This
is extensively used in speech and image authentication problems, where data
from a considerable number of users are collected to create a world model (also
called a universal background model). This approach is closely related to the
model examined in this paper, since it originates in the seminal work of [13], who
employed an empirical Bayes technique for estimating a prior over models. Thus,
the world model is a distribution over models, although due to computational
considerations a point estimate is used instead in practice [20].
The adversary may actively try to avoid detection, through knowledge of the
detection method. In essence, this changes the setting from a statistical to an
adversarial one. For such problems, game theoretic approaches are frequently
used. Dalvi et al. [6] investigated the adversarial classification problem as
a two-person game. More precisely, they examined the optimal strategy of
an adversary against a standard (adversary-unaware) classifier as well as that
of a classifier (adversary-aware) against a rational adversary. This was under
the assumption that the adversary has complete knowledge of the detection
algorithm. In a similar vein, Lowd et al. [15] have investigated algorithms
for reverse engineering linear classifiers. This allows them to retrieve sufficient
information to mount effective attacks.
In our paper we do not consider repeated interactions and thus we do not
follow a game-theoretic approach. We instead consider how to model the ad-
versary, when we have a lot of data from legitimate users, but no data from
the adversary. Our main contribution is a Bayesian method for calculating a
subjective upper bound on attack probabilities without any knowledge of the
adversary model. This can be obtained simply by using the current (unlabelled)
observations to create a worst-case (or more generally pessimistic) model of the
adversary.1 This is done by conditioning the prior over adversary models ac-
cording to new (unlabelled) observations.
However, in order to control overfitting, we first condition the adversary
model’s prior on the data of the remaining population of users. This results in
an empirical Bayes estimate of the prior [21], which is what the world model
approach essentially is [13]. The prior then acts as a soft constraint when
selecting the worst-case adversary model.
It is worthwhile to note that the problem of constructing a model for a class
with no data is related to the problem of null hypothesis testing, for which sim-
ilar ideas have appeared. For example, [10] explored the idea of constructing a
maximum likelihood estimate from the obsrvations and using this as the alter-
native hypothesis. More sophisticated examples for simple parametric problems
were examined in [2]. This involved selecting the worst-case prior from a given
class of priors in order to be maximally pessimistic about the null hypothesis.
1Some simpler alternative approaches are explored in an accompanying technical report [9].
Our approach is similar in spirit, but the application and technical details are
substantially different.
Our final contribution is an experimental analysis on a synthetic problem,
as well as on some real-world data, with promising results: we show that the
widely used world model approach cannot outperform the proposed model.
2 The proposed model framework
In the framework we consider, we assume that the set of all possible models is
M. Each model µ in M is associated with a probability measure over the set
of observations X , which will be denoted by µ(x) for x ∈ X , µ ∈ M, so long
as there is no ambiguity. We must decide whether some observations x ∈ X ,
have been generated by a model q (the user) or a model w (the adversary) in
M. Throughout the paper, we assume a prior probability of the user having
generated the data, P(q), with a complementary prior P(w) = 1−P(q), for the
adversary.
In the easiest scenario, we have perfect knowledge of q, w ∈ M. It is then
trivial to calculate the probability P(q|x) that the user q has generated the data
x. This is the oracle decision rule, defined in section 2.1. This is not a realisable
rule, as although we could accurately estimate q with enough data, in general
there is no way to estimate the adversary model w.
We thus consider the case where the user model is known and where we
are given a prior density ξ(w) over the possible adversary models w ∈ M.
Currently seen observations are then used to form a pessimistic posterior ξ′ for
the adversary. This is explained in Section 2.2.
Section 2.3 discusses the more practical case where neither the user model
q, nor a prior ξ over models M are known, but must be estimated from data.
More precisely, the section discusses methods for utilising other user data to
obtain a prior distribution over models. This amounts to an empirical Bayes
estimate of the prior distribution [21]. It is then possible to estimate q by
conditioning the prior on the user data. This is closely related to the adapted
world model approach [20], used in authentication applications, which however,
usually employs a point approximation to the prior [5].
2.1 The oracle decision rule
We shall measure the performance of all the models against that of the oracle
decision rule. The oracle enjoys perfect information about the distribution of
both the user and the adversary, and thus knows both q and w, as well as the
a priori probability of an attack, P(w). On average, no other decision rule can
do better.
More precisely, let M be the space of all models. Let the adversary’s model
be w and the user’s model be q, with q, w ∈ M. Given some data x, we would
like to determine the probability that the data x has been generated by the
user, P(q|x). The oracle model has knowledge of w, q and P(q), so using Bayes’
rule we obtain:
P(q|x) =
q(x)P(q)
q(x)P(q) + w(x)(1 −P(q))
. (1)
However, we usually have uncertainty about both the adversary and the user
model. Concerning the adversary, the uncertainty is much more pronounced.
The next section examines a model for the probability of an attack when the
user model is perfectly known but we only have a prior ξ(w) for the adversary
model.
2.2 Bayesian adversary model
We can use a subjective prior probability ξ(w) over possible adversary models,
to calculate the probability of observations given that they have been generated
by the adversary: ξ(x) =
∫
M
w(x)ξ(w)dw.2 Given a user model q, we can
express the probability of the user q given the observations x under the belief ξ
as:
ξ(q|x) , P(q|x, ξ) =
q(x)P(q)
q(x)P(q) + ξ(x) (1−P(q))
. (2)
The difference with (1) is that, instead of w(x), we use the marginal density ξ(x).
If ξ(w) represents our subjective belief about the adversary model w, then (2)
can be seen as the Bayesian equivalent of the world model approach, where the
prior over w plays the role of the world model. Now let: ξ′(w) , ξ(w|x) be the
model posterior for some observations x. We shall need the following lemma:
Lemma 2.1. For any probability measure ξ on M, where M is a space of
probability distributions on X , such that each µ ∈ M defines a probability (den-
sity) µ(x) with x ∈ X , with admissible posteriors ξ′(µ) , ξ(µ|x), the marginal
likelihood satisfies: ξ′(x) ≥ ξ(x), ∀x ∈ X .
A simple proof, using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality on the norm induced
by the measure ξ, is presented in the Appendix. From the above lemma, it
immediately follows that:
ξ(q|x) ≥ ξ′(q|x) =
q(x)P(q)
q(x)P(q) + (1−P(q))
∫
M
w(x)ξ′(w) dw
, (3)
since ξ′(x) =
∫
w(x)ξ′(w) dw ≥
∫
w(x)ξ′(w) dw = ξ(x). Thus (3) gives us a
subjective upper bound on the probability of the data x having been generated
by the adversary. This bound can then be used to make decisions. Finally, note
that we can form ξ′(w) on a subset of x. This possibility is explored in the
experiments.
2Here we used the fact that ξ(x|w) = w(x), since the probability of the observations given
a specific model w no longer depends on our belief ξ about which model w is correct.
2.3 Prior and user model estimation
Specifically for user authentication, we have data from two sources. The first
is data collected from the user which we wish to identify. The second is data
collected from other persons.3 The i-th person can be fully specified in terms of
a model µi ∈ M, with µi drawn from some unknown distribution γ over M. If
we had the models µi ∈ M for all the other people in our dataset, then we could
obtain an empirical estimate γˆ of the prior distribution of models. Empirical
Bayes methods for prior estimation [21] extend this procedure to the case where
we only observe x ∼ µi, data drawn from the model µi.
Let us now apply this prior over models to the estimation of the posterior
over models for some user. Given an estimate γˆ of γ, and some data x ∼ µ
from the user, and assuming that µ ∼ γ, we can form a posterior for µ using
Bayes rule: γˆ(µ|x) = µ(x)ξ(µ)/
∫
M
γˆ(x|µ)ξ(dµ), over all µ ∈ M. For a specific
user k with data xk, we write the posterior as ψk(µ) , γˆ(µ|xk). Whenever we
must decide the class of a new observation x, we set the prior over the adversary
models to ξ = γˆ and then condition on part, or all, of x to obtain the posterior
ξ′(w). We then calculate
P(qk|x, ξ
′, ψk) =
ψk(x)P(qk)
[ψk(x)P(qk) + (1−P(qk))ξ′(x)]
, (4)
the posterior probability of the k-th user given the observations x and our beliefs
ξ′ and ψk over adversary and user models respectively. When ξ
′ = ξ, we obtain
an equivalent to the world model approach of [20], which is an approximate
form of the empirical Bayes procedure suggested in [13].
2.3.1 Prior estimation for multinomial models
For discrete observations, we can consider multinomial distributions drawn from
a Dirichlet density, and use a maximum likelihood estimate based on Polya
distributions for γ. More specifically, we use the fixed point approach suggested
in [16] to estimate Dirichlet parameters Φ from a set of multinomial observations.
To make this more concrete, consider multinomial observations of degree K.
Our initial belief ξ(µ) is a Dirichlet prior with parameters Φ , (φ1, . . . , φK) over
models: ξ(µ) = 1B(Φ)
∏K
i=1 µ
φi−1
i , which is conjugate to the multinomial [7].
Given a sequence of observations x1, . . . , xn, with xt ∈ 1, . . .K, where each
outcome i has fixed probability µi, then ci =
∑n
t=1 I(xt = i), where I is an
indicator function, is multinomial and the posterior distribution over the pa-
rameters µi is also Dirichlet with parameters φ
′
i = φi + ci. The approach
suggested in [16] uses the following fixed point iteration for the parameters:
φnewi = φi
P
k
Ψ(cik+φi)−Ψ(φi)P
k
Ψ(ck+
P
i
φi)−Ψ(
P
i
ai)
, where Ψ(·) is the digamma function.
3These are not necessarily other users.
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Figure 1: The evolution of error rates as more data becomes available, when the
user model and prior are estimated. The points indicate means from 104 runs
and the lines top and bottom 5% percentiles from a bootstrap sample.
3 Experimental evaluation
We have performed a number of experiments in order to evaluate the proposed
approach and compared it to the full Bayesian version of the well-known world
model approach. We performed a set of experiments on synthetic data, and
another set of experiments on real data.
For the synthetic experiments, we assume multinomial models, but rather
than knowing γ, we use data from other users to form an empirical estimate γˆ,
as described in Sec. 2.3.1. Furthermore, q is itself unknown and is estimated
via Bayesian updating from γˆ and some data specific to the user. We then
compare the oracle and the world model approach (based on γ) with a number
of differently biased adversary models. The world model is based on the estimate
γˆ. The adversary model uses the world model γˆ as the adversary prior (ξ).
The second group concerns experiments on data gathered from an access
control system. The data has been discretized into 1320 integer variables, in
order for it to be modelled with multinomials. The models are of course not
available so we must estimate the priors: The data of a subset of users is used
to estimate γˆ. The remaining users alternatively take on the roles of legitimate
users and adversaries.
We compare the following types of models, which correspond to the legends
in the figures of the experimental results. (a) The oracle model, which enjoys
perfect information concerning adversary and user distributions. (b) The world
model, which uses the prior over user models as a surrogate for the adversary
model. (c) The bias world model, which uses all but the last observation to
obtain a posterior over adversary models, and similarly: (d) the f bias world
model, which uses all observations, (e) the p bias world model, which weighs
the observations by 1/2 and (f) the n bias world model, which uses the first
half of the observations. In all cases, we used percentile calculations based
on multiple runs and/or bootstrap replicates [11] to assess the significance of
results.
3.1 Synthetic experiments
For this evaluation, we ran 104 independent experiments and employed multino-
mial models. For each experiment, we first generated the true prior distribution
over user models γ. This was created by drawing Dirichlet parameters φi in-
dependently from a Gamma distribution. We also generated the true prior
distribution over adversary models γ′, by drawing from the same Gamma dis-
tribution. Then, a user model q was drawn from γ and an adversary model w
was drawn from γ′. Finally, by flipping a coin, we generated data x1, . . . , xn
from either q or w. Assuming equal prior probabilities of user and adversary, we
predicted the most probable class and recorded the error. This was done for all
subsequences of the observations’ sequence x. Thus, the experiment measures
the performance of methods when the amount of data that informs our decision
increases.
For these experiments, we estimate the actual Dirichlet distribution with γˆ.
This estimation is performed via empirical Bayes using data from 1000 users
drawn from the actual prior γ. At the k-th run, we draw a user model qk ∼ γ
and subsequently draw xk ∼ qk. We then use γˆ and the user data xk ∈ NK ,
to estimate a posterior over user models for the k-th user, ψk(q) , γˆ(q|xk).
The estimated prior γˆ is also used as the world model and as the prior over
adversary models. The results, shown in Figure 1, show that the biased models
consistently outperform the classic world model approach, while the partially
biased models become significantly better than the fully biased models when
the amount of observations increases. This is encouraging for application to
real-world data.
3.2 Real data
The real world data were collected from an RFID based access control system
used in two buildings of the TNO organization (Netherlands Organization for
Applied Scientific Research). The data were collected during a three and a half
month period, and they include successful accesses of 882 users, collected from
55 RFID readers granting access to users attempting to pass through doors in
the buildings.
The initial data included three fields: the time and date that the access
has been granted, the reader that has been used to get access and the ID of
the RFID tag used4. In order to use the data in the experimental evaluation
of the proposed model framework, we have discretized the time into hour-long
intervals, and counted the number of accesses, per hour, per door for each user,
in each day. This resulted in a total of ≈ 2 ·105 records. Since there are 24 hour-
long slots in a day, and a total of 55 reader-equipped doors, this discretisation
allowed us to model each user by a 1320-degree multinomial/Dirichlet model.
Thus, even though the underlying Dirchlet/multinomial model framework is
simple, the very high dimensionality of the observations makes the estimation
and decision problem particularly taxing.
3.2.1 Experiments
We performed 10 independent runs. For the k-th run, we selected a random
subset Uγ of the complete set of users U , such that |Uγ |/|U | = 2/3. We used
Uγ to estimate the world model γˆ. The remaining users UT = U\Uγ were used
to estimated the error rate over 103 repetitions. For the j-th repetition, we
randomly selected a user i ∈ UT with at least 10 records Di. We used half of
those records, D¯i, to obtain ψi(q) , γˆ(q|D¯i). By flipping a coin, we obtain
either (a) one record from Di\D¯i, or (b) data from some other user in UT .
Let us call that data xj . For the biased models, we set ξ = γˆ and then used
xj to obtain ξ(w|f(xj)), where f(·) denotes the appropriate transformation.
Figure 2 shows results for the baseline world model approach (world), where
f(x) = ∅, as the unmodified world model is used for the adversary, the full
bias approach (f bias), where f(x) = x since all the data is used, and finally
the partial bias approach (p bias) where f(x) = x/2. The other approaches
are not examined, as the oracle is not realisable, while the half-data and the
all-but-last-data biased models are equivalent to the baseline world model, since
we do not have a sequence of observations, but only a single record.
As can be seen in Figure 2, the baseline world model is always performing
worse than the biased models, though in two runs the full bias model is close.
Finally, though the two biased models are not distinguishable performance-wise,
we noted a difference in the ratio of false positives to false negatives. Over the
10 runs, this was 0.2± 0.1 for the world model approach, 2.5± 0.5 for the fully
biased model, and 0.9± 0.2 for the partially biased model.
4 Conclusion
We have presented a very simple, yet effective approach for classification prob-
lems where one class has no data. In particular, we define a prior over models
which can be estimated from population data. This is adapted, as in the stan-
dard world-model approach, to a specific user. We introduce the idea of creating
4The data were sanitised to avoid privacy issues.
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Figure 2: Error rates for 10 runs on the TNO door data. The error bars indicate
top and bottom 5% percentiles from 100 bootstrap samples from 103 repetitions
per run.
an adversary model, for which no labelled data exists, from the prior and cur-
rently seen data. Within the subjective Bayesian framework, this allows us to
obtain a subjective upper bound on the probability of an attack.
Experimentally, it is shown 5 that: (a) we outperform the classical world
model approach, while (b) it is always better to only partially condition the
models on the new observations.
It is possible to extend the approach to the cost-sensitive case. Since we
already have bounds on the probability of each class, together with a given cost
matrix, we can also calculate bounds on the expected cost. This will allow us
to make cost-sensitive decisions.
A related issue is whether to alter the a priori class probabilities; in our
comparative experiments we used equal fixed values of 0.5. It is possible to
utilise the population data to tune it in order to achieve some desired false
positive / negative ratio. Such an automatic procedure would be useful for
an expected performance curve [1] comparison between the various approaches.
Finally, since the experiments on this relatively complex problem gave promising
5In an accompanying technical report [9], the effect of dimensionality on the performance
of the method is also examined. There, it is shown that a Bayesian framework is essential
for such a scheme to work and that naive approaches perform progressively worse as the
dimensionality increases.
results, we plan to evaluate it on other problems that exhibit a lack of adversarial
data.
A Proof
Lemma 2.1. For discrete M, the marginal prior ξ(x) can be re-written as fol-
lows:
ξ(x) =
∑
µ
ξ(x, µ) =
∑
µ
ξ(x|µ)ξ(µ) =
∑
µ
µ(x)ξ(µ), (5)
and similarly: ξ′(x) = 1P
µ
µ(x)ξ(µ)
∑
µ µ(x)
2ξ(µ). Thus, to prove the required
statement, it is sufficient to show
(∑
µ
µ(x)2ξ(µ)
)1/2
≥
∑
µ
µ(x)ξ(µ). (6)
Similarly, for continuous M, we obtain:
(∫
µ(x)2 dξ(µ)
)1/2
≥
∫
µ(x) dξ(µ). (7)
In both cases, the norm induced by the probability measure ξ on M is ‖f‖2 =
(
∫
M
|f(µ)|2 dξ(µ))1/2, thus allowing us to included apply the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality ‖fg‖1 ≤ ‖f‖2‖g‖2. By setting f(µ) = µ(x) and g(µ) = 1, we ob-
tain the required result, since ‖g‖2 = (
∫
M
dξ(µ))1/2 = 1, as ξ is a probability
measure.
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